Europe’s Own Narrative and the Effort to Spread Democratization by Nielson, Poul
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Europe’s Own Narrative and the Effort to Spread Democratization
Nielson, Poul
Publication date:
2010
Document Version
Også kaldet Forlagets PDF
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Nielson, P. (2010). Europe’s Own Narrative and the Effort to Spread Democratization. CCIS, Center for
Comparative Integration Studies, Aalborg University.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
 
CCIS 
Center for Comparative  
Integration Studies 
Aalborg University 
Kroghstrraede 3 
DK-9220 Aalborg East 
Phone: +45 9940 8310 
 
E-mail: ccis@lists.ihis.aau.dk  
 
Europe’s Own Narrative  and 
the Effort to Spread 
Democratization 
 
Prof. Poul Nielson  
CCIS RESEARCH SERIES 
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 11 
 
 
ISSN: 1901-9718 
©  2010 Prof. Poul Nielson 
 Europe’s Own Narrative and the Effort to Spread Democratization Globally 
 (This article is a part of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance's (IDEA) Democracy project, and is published in agreement with the author.) 
Center for Comparative Integration Studies (CCIS) 
 Aalborg University 
 Denmark  
 CCIS Research Series 
 Working Paper No. 11 
 
 
ISSN 1901-9718 
 
 
Published by 
CCIS & Department of History, International and Social Studies 
Aalborg University 
 
 
Distribution 
Download as PDF on 
http://www.ccis.aau.dk/research/2012439 
 
 
Lay-out and word processing 
Cirkeline Kappel and Ellen Nyrup 
 
 
The Secretariat 
Center for Comparative Integration Studies 
Kroghstraede 3, room 3.243 
Aalborg University 
DK-9220 Aalborg East  
Denmark 
Tel. +  45 9940 8310 
 
 
E-mail: ccis@lists.ihis.aau.dk 
Homepage: http://www.ihis.aau.dk/ccis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Europe’s Own Narrative and the Effort to Spread 
Democratization Globally1 
 
Professor Poul Nielson2 
 
 
Abstract 
Given the centuries of dominance of European political thinking, and European 
economic and cultural influence, many have a tendency to regard globalization 
as the same as the world adapting to European norms and values. Some caution 
is therefore needed, both for those in other parts of the world who try to emulate 
what has been done in Europe and for those in Europe who try to ‘export’ their 
experiences and values. It is important to keep an open mind about the fact that 
we expect the basic principles of democracy to be shared values – even if they 
are not given unreserved and explicit support everywhere and their interpretation 
may differ somewhat. When we look at some of the attempts in other regions of 
the world to start a process of democratic integration, the uniqueness of the 
background of the European case becomes clear. It also becomes clear that it 
makes a big difference whether there are real, practical problems for which 
acting in common makes sense or such integration is mainly based on a political 
dream. The functional approach is a method of integration that builds on the 
principle of focusing on those problems that are truly shared and which can best, 
or only, be resolved by common action. A more functional definition of 
sovereignty is joining with others to create options for action that were out of the 
reach of a country acting on its own. It has gradually become evident in the 
crucial and traditionally power-focused area of foreign and security policy that 
Europe must be able to speak with one voice if it wants to exert any influence on 
global matters and to be able to take care of its legitimate interests. The 
successive rounds of enlargement of the EU provide the strongest possible 
evidence of the attractiveness of the basic principles behind European 
integration as well as their practical application. It should also be noted that for 
countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal – not to mention the whole wave 
of Central and East European states and the Balkan countries – it was not only 
economic reasons that made the EU attractive. Membership of the EU made 
newly achieved democratization irreversible. Continuing support for 
democratization through all its instruments is both meaningful and important, 
but the decisive contribution will come from the EU’s own behaviour globally. 
                                                          
1   This article is a part of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance's (IDEA) Democracy project, and is published in agreement with the author. 
2  Former EU-Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, former 
Danish Minister for Development Cooperation and Minister for Energy 
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That is what determines the credibility of the actions undertaken under the 
banner of promoting democracy. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is always risky to make comparisons between different countries and regions. 
We tend to take it for granted that our history and experiences are well known to 
others. This is especially the case for Europeans, and for Westerners in general. 
Given the centuries of dominance of European political thinking, and European 
economic and cultural influence, many have a tendency to regard globalization 
as the same as the world adapting to European norms and values. Some caution 
is therefore needed, both for those in other parts of the world who try to emulate 
what has been done in Europe and for those in Europe who try to ‘export’ their 
experiences and values.  
 
On the other hand, we also know that there would have been more human 
progress if we were better at learning from the mistakes and successes of others. 
It is important to understand difference in order to better identify elements that 
are relevant and applicable to others, and to keep an open mind about the fact 
that, in the world today, we expect the basic principles of democracy to be 
shared values – even if they are not given unreserved and explicit support 
everywhere and even if their interpretation may differ somewhat. We do not live 
in a global village. This idea is misleading. A village is characterized by 
closeness, shared norms and cultural uniformity. The world today may be 
characterized by closeness, due to modern communications technologies, but not 
by shared norms or cultural uniformity.  
 
The background and historical setting in which the Coal and Steel Community 
was founded was unique. The huge logistics operation across the Atlantic during 
the Second World War (1939–45), which necessitated effective brokering 
between different interests and stakeholders as well as a high degree of 
centralized management in its implementation, was the cornerstone and the 
experience on which key architects, such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, 
built the Coal and Steel Community. The Marshall aid from the United States 
and the conditions attached to it about opening up national economies across 
European borders was another important element. 
 
The task during the war had been to ensure that the productive capacity of the 
USA could be put to use in Europe. The challenge after the war was to 
restructure the basic industrial sectors – coal mining and steel production – 
which had been the backbone of civilian and military production in all six 
countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
There was a structural overcapacity, but each country was afraid to reduce its 
capacity. A common and balanced plan was needed to create sufficient 
confidence in the planned changes, but a plan was not enough. A High Authority 
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with independence and the power to ensure that plans were adhered to was key 
to the successful transformation. This was accepted by the six countries – 
mainly because the alternative would have been chaos. 
 
 
2. A Europe built on a Functional Approach 
In reality, this was the birth of the functional approach – the method of 
integration that builds on the principle of focusing on those problems that are 
truly shared and which can best, or only, be resolved by common action. It 
became clear that dealing with the closure of surplus mines and industrial sites 
across Europe, and eliminating or redefining millions of jobs, was not only a 
highly demanding and dynamic process politically, but also a process that could 
not be limited in scope to specific sectors or geographic locations. This was the 
birth of the dynamic substantive character of integration. It was clear early on, 
and clearly expressed in the Treaty of Rome which launched the Common 
Market in 1958, that it would not make sense to try to define a fixed limit to the 
kind of issues that could or should be drawn into the cooperation. This was not 
in any way a deviation from the functional approach – it had simply been 
experienced in practice that other issues such as social affairs, labour market 
relations, transport and energy were necessary components for inclusion in the 
management of the industrial and economic change processes. 
 
This was the birth of the functional approach – the method of integration that 
builds on the principle of focusing on those problems that are truly shared and 
which can best, or only, be resolved by common action.  
 
To the core principles that grew out of the Coal and Steel Community the Treaty 
of Rome added a layer of political principles and aspirations of a more general 
character for the future of Europe. This is the other cornerstone of what is 
special about the case of Europe: it made future wars between the European 
nations impossible, expressing work towards an ever closer union as a political 
goal in itself and establishing an architecture of institutions that was unique – 
first and foremost by creating an independent Commission that built on the 
experience of the High Authority. 
 
This is what is special about the case of Europe: it made future wars between 
the European nations impossible, expressing work towards an ever closer 
union as a political goal in itself and establishing an architecture of 
institutions that was unique. 
 
When we look at some of the attempts in other regions of the world to start a 
process of democratic integration, the uniqueness of the background of the 
European case becomes abundantly clear. It also becomes clear that it makes a 
big difference whether there are real, practical problems for which acting in 
common makes sense or such integration is mainly based on a political dream. 
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Over the years many attempts have been made to draw up a more definite 
delineation of the scope of issues and policy areas that the Community should 
deal with. The most prominent of these was the proposal for a so-called 
competence catalogue, which was brought into the discussions of the convention 
to draw up the proposed constitutional treaty, which later became the Lisbon 
Treaty and finally entered into force on 1 December 2009. Germany had been 
pushing this idea, but no magic formula could be found to describe in a 
definitive manner what the Community should engage in and what it should not. 
More or less at the same time, in the light of serious flooding of rivers in 
Europe, Germany proposed the establishment of a Disaster Fund of more than 
one billion euros, to be taken from the budget of the European Union (EU) and 
managed by the European Commission. All of a sudden such events were no 
longer a national responsibility. The difficult situation created by bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy is another illustration of a problem that sparked 
recognition of the need for stronger collective legislation and action. While no 
competence catalogue was included in the Lisbon Treaty, there are more checks 
for national parliaments to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is respected 
when the Commission makes new proposals, that is, to make sure that matters 
really are of a kind that necessitate common action. 
 
In other words, tasting the fruits of the successful application of the functional 
integration method provides feedback that stimulates institutional self-
confidence. The overall picture of the attitude of EU member states towards 
more integration, however, means that this does not simply lead to uncritical 
acceptance of the pooling of more political decision making power into the 
collectivity of the Community. The Lisbon Treaty shows us that although the 
EU member states are willing to move forward on matters concerning justice 
and home affairs, such as how to cope with the problems of terrorism or 
migration pressure, they are not ready, for instance, to pool decision making 
power in the area of foreign policy. The creation of an EU Foreign Minister does 
not change the fact that the two European permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council do what they do there without any discussion in the 
Council of Foreign Ministers. 
 
 
3. The EU Institutions 
Probably the most important source of misunderstanding in many descriptions of 
the institutional character of the EU is the temptation to compare this unique 
emerging political system with the model of a nation state. The Commission in 
particular is the victim of many false comparisons. That the architecture and the 
relations between the institutions are neither finalized nor static, and that there 
are no clearly defined, final goal towards which European cooperation is 
moving, also add to the confusion. A key to a better understanding of the 
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character and mode of operation of the EU is to note that in everything that any 
of the institutions does, they are working on an explicitly expressed legal basis. 
 
Probably the most important source of misunderstanding in many descriptions 
of the institutional character of the EU is the temptation to compare this 
unique emerging political system with the model of a nation state. The 
Commission in particular is the victim of many false comparisons. 
 
 
The European Commission 
The Commission is unique because of its independence. Commissioners are 
loyal to the EU and do not represent their national interests. It is important that 
the Commission consists of members from all EU member states because this 
ensures the presence of political know-how covering all of Europe. A 
Commission without such a composition would have less legitimacy and 
authority. The Commission is unique also because it has been given the right of 
initiative. Giving responsibility for preparing, proposing and steering legislation 
to a body that is independent of the politics and special interests of individual 
member states has been key to building up the huge ‘acquis’ of more than 
85,000 pages of legislation. The fact that legislation starts with preparatory work 
and analysis inside the Commission makes it the focal point of interest. The 
Commission has considerable administrative and political clout in executing its 
role as the guardian of the Treaty, especially in core areas of the Community 
such as securing competition and the smooth functioning of the internal market. 
Finally, the Commission exerts direct influence in areas such as agriculture, 
trade negotiations and development cooperation where it has explicit 
competences to act on behalf of the Community. This all looks highly 
impressive. The reality, however, is more complicated. The Commission does 
not act alone in all these areas, and from one policy area to another the balance 
of power may shift considerably between EU institutions. 
 
 
The European Parliament 
The European Parliament has emerged as a body of real political significance, 
not only generally as the representative voice of the European electorate but also 
by performing constructively in the legislative process. The huge investment in 
interpretation services, which makes it possible for Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) to speak in their own language, is an interesting feature of 
some relevance to other regional assemblies. That Europe-wide political party 
groupings are the real elements in the brokering processes, rather than national 
parties, is also an important factor to note.  
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The European Parliament has emerged as a body of real political significance, 
not only generally as the representative voice of the European electorate but 
also by performing constructively in the legislative process. 
 
A good measure of the increased political weight of the European Parliament 
can be seen in the growing number of lobbyists who court the different 
committees, compared to the situation in the past when lobbyists focused on 
influencing the Commission at all levels or the committees and working groups 
in the Council. In recent years a deliberate effort has been made to register these 
lobbyists, which puts the European Parliament and the Commission ahead of 
most EU member states in this regard. 
 
 
The Council 
The Council, in its different configurations which cover different ministerial 
areas as well as the foreign minister’s General Affairs and External Relations 
Council and the heads of governments’ European Council, is the ultimate centre 
of decision making. There is an elaborate structure of committees that prepares 
these meeting in a process that continually involves government structures in the 
capitals of the member states. The Committee of Permanent Representatives of 
the member states (COREPER) is the final brokering organ at the professional 
and diplomatic level before the ministers take over. The whole operation is 
managed by the Council Secretariat General along with the member state that 
holds the rotating Presidency of the Council. The character of the decision 
making process varies from one area to another, according to whether it is 
covered by qualified majority voting. The Council and the European Parliament 
have to agree, and the Commission is the broker in this often complex process. 
In this sense, it could be argued that Council and Parliament together perform 
what in a national political system would be the role of the parliament. This is 
broadened out in the sense that national parliaments are drawn into the process 
to varying degrees by giving more or less explicit mandates to their ministers 
before they attend Council meetings, in addition to the general control functions 
they exercise over the performance of their governments. 
 
The six-month rotating presidencies have had a tendency to push special items 
up the agenda, reflecting a wish to raise profiles either domestically or 
internationally. This can be both good and bad, but is normally a waste of time 
and energy given the burdensome character of getting anything decided in the 
first place. The rotating presidencies may have injected more energy into the 
process, and in any case have increased the visibility of European cooperation in 
the presidency country. They have also added to the complexity of the 
processes, however, and the inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty of the office of 
President of the Council, thereby creating a more permanent chairmanship, will 
probably give more continuity and predictability to the work of the EU. 
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In practice it has not been easy for the Commission to defend its right of 
initiative. Both individual presidencies and the meetings of the European 
Council have frequently asked the Commission to take on more or less specific 
tasks, so the dialogue between Council and Commission is in reality more of a 
two-way street. This is even more the case in the area of foreign policy, where 
the shared competence is now expressed in the position of EU foreign minister 
who will chair the Council of foreign ministers as well as being vice-president 
of the Commission. The economic and monetary sphere is also an area where 
the Commission, the Council of finance ministers and the European Central 
Bank share competences in a somewhat unclear manner. 
 
 
The Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is also among the most 
important EU institutions. The existence of an institution that has the power to 
interpret and decide with legal authority on all disputes that relate to the treaties 
and legislation of the EU is the ultimate reality check that confirms that the EU 
is an emerging political system. The role of the judiciary is very different in 
different EU members states. Some have a judicial tradition with well 
established powers to rule on the constitutionality of issues, and so on, while in 
others the judiciary has a more passive role. The role of the Court of Justice is 
more firmly defined in the Lisbon Treaty and it actively upholds and uses its 
independence. This is a feature of the EU that is also of great relevance to other 
regions of the world that are trying, with more or less determination, to create 
something similar. 
 
 
4. Functional Sovereignty, Internal Democracy and Effective Governance 
The relationship between the EU and its member states is often described in the 
framework of a zero sum game: member states transfer decision making power 
to the EU on matters they have decided to deal with collectively, thus reducing 
their sovereignty. This description is, of course, correct if the term sovereignty is 
given its traditional and rather narrow meaning. It is not the whole truth, 
however, if sovereignty is defined as a nation’s genuine capacity to deal 
meaningfully with issues by itself, that is, to decide and manage alone. Looked 
at in this way, a more functional definition of sovereignty becomes apparent, 
and that a nation can add to its functional – or real – sovereignty by joining with 
others to create options for action that were out of the reach of a country acting 
on its own. The traditional – or primitive – definition of sovereignty has 
naturally been a powerful element in the rhetoric of eurosceptics across the 
continent. On the other hand, it has gradually become evident in the crucial and 
traditionally power-focused area of foreign and security policy that Europe must 
be able to speak with one voice if it wants to exert any influence on global 
matters and to be able to take care of its legitimate interests. 
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It has gradually become evident in the crucial and traditionally power-focused 
area of foreign and security policy that Europe must be able to speak with one 
voice if it wants to exert any influence on global matters and to be able to take 
care of its legitimate interests.  
 
 
The Democratic Deficit 
One of the most frequent criticisms to arise in discussions about EU institutions 
is the so-called democratic deficit. This is mainly aimed at the Commission, 
which is, on the one hand, often described as consisting of bureaucrats while, at 
the same time, being criticized for being a political institution without the 
legitimacy of having been directly elected. The fact is that the Commission is a 
political institution and the Commissioners are politicians. The method of their 
appointment reflects the fact that the governments in the member states have a 
direct say in this, in a process in which they first agree a President of the 
Commission and then, together with him or her, nominate the other 
Commissioners, who are then examined by the European Parliament before 
being appointed. This procedure is a good illustration of the extent – or the 
limits – of EU integration. The interesting point is that those who talk about the 
democratic deficit in this regard are usually the same people who are opposed to 
more integration in Europe. 
 
There is, however, another way of looking at the issue of the democratic deficit. 
Democracy is not only about human rights and the protection of minorities. 
Democracy is also a method for governing and for making society function. 
Given this fact, the whole discussion of a democratic deficit in the EU is a 
confirmation that the EU is regarded as a political system, and the most serious 
element contributing to a democratic deficit is the inability of the Council to 
make timely, clear and authoritative decisions. The ‘governance delivery 
capacity’ of the system is weakened primarily by the veto rights of member 
states, which survive under the Lisbon Treaty. Secondarily, the continued 
insistence of member states on limiting the Community’s jurisdiction when it 
comes to prosecuting fraud involving the use of Community funds in the 
member states is also testimony of a democratic deficit.  
 
It would, of course, be easy to stretch this point too far, but the yardstick of the 
discussion about a democratic deficit is that the EU is being compared to an 
established democracy in a nation state. If this were really taken as the basis for 
such a judgement, one could be tempted to characterize the EU as something 
that came close to a failed state. It has been made clear above, however, that the 
EU is not only still a work in progress, but also a unique political experiment 
that does not have a definite end goal. Nonetheless, as a European parallel to the 
well established international discussion of governance it makes sense to take a 
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closer look at the importance of a system’s capacity to produce authoritative 
political decisions and to deliver credible and efficient administration. 
 
The EU is not only still a work in progress, but also a unique political 
experiment that does not have a definite end goal.  
 
Governance is such a useful term because, in spite of its lack of precision, 
everybody is able to use it meaningfully. Democracy is not possible without 
some level of governance – and vice versa. Given the experience of post-conflict 
situations, failed states and the emerging democracies around the world, more 
practical, down to earth issues such as securing stability and some basic 
functioning in a society have gained increased recognition as crucial to the 
broader processes of democratization. A case in point is the emerging more 
pragmatic attitude to a strategy for Afghanistan. 
 
 
Bureaucracy 
The next step in this discussion is to focus on the much maligned term 
‘bureaucracy’. In the EU context bureaucracy is almost synonymous with the 
Commission. Naturally, the negative side of the term relates to excessive and 
rigid administrative practices, which often reflect the system’s own internal 
interests and dislike of adapting to new ideas – or of letting go of some of the 
power that has been built up by these practices. It is often the case, however, that 
criticism comes from those who have had more or less special interests ruled out 
in favour of the common interest of the Community. The fact that European 
cooperation is more than governments meeting now and then to agree broad 
principles also contributes to the demonization of the ‘bureaucrats in Brussels’. 
The Single Act in 1986 was in principle only a reconfirmation of the basic 
principles contained in the Treaty of Rome, defining the internal market as the 
free circulation of people, goods and services. It took more than 300 directives, 
however, to hammer out specific rules and to abolish the different protectionist 
practices, technical trade barriers, and so on, that EU member states had used to 
protect their home markets. In the areas of telecommunications, insurance and 
other services as well as energy supply – especially electricity and natural gas – 
it took more than a decade for the opening up across borders to be taken up in a 
second wave of comprehensive legislation. 
 
Everyone agrees that this has been highly beneficial for the economy of Europe, 
but it was only achieved because the Commission was equipped with sufficient 
staff – quantitatively and qualitatively – to carry out the analysis, sector by 
sector and issue by issue, to make it possible for the Commission to produce the 
huge body of complicated legislative proposals, and to maintain expertise in all 
these areas, which made it possible for the Commission to credibly oversee their 
implementation and thus deliver on its role as the guardian of the Treaty. 
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Most of the huge endeavour of making the internal market a reality has been 
carried out using directives rather than regulations as the legal instrument to 
harmonize standards and rules across Europe. Directives are typically easier to 
get member states to agree to, because their transformation into national law is 
in the hands of the member states, which normally allows for some degree of 
flexibility over how details might be interpreted. In short, the purpose and core 
substance of a directive has to be adhered to, but there might be some room for 
manoeuvre in the choice of methods of implementation. Regulations, by 
contrast, are immediately applicable law in the Community and are identical in 
all members states. 
 
One obvious question is why clear and seemingly much more expeditious 
regulation has not been the preferred way of legislating. The answer is that 
directives are politically easier to integrate or ‘weave’ into existing national 
legislation and that regulations, methodologically speaking, represent a higher 
level of European integration. One might say that this process has been nothing 
less than an orgy of pragmatism, and that without the bureaucracy – and 
institutional stamina - the Commission would not have been able to steer it and 
push it forward. Maybe one difference between the bureaucracy of the 
Commission and the traditional perception of bureaucracy lies in the fact that the 
Commission bureaucracy performs the innovative and dynamic role of the 
Commission in exercising its right of initiative, whereas bureaucracy in well 
established nation states is more vulnerable to criticism.  
 
The lesson from this discussion of ‘governance, bureaucracy and democracy’ is 
that without allowing for an administrative capacity to grow and a civil service 
to gain some strength and respectability, the prospects for democracy in a nation 
state will be weak; and without allowing the same to happen in the context of a 
regional organization, the prospects for successful regional integration will be 
also be weak. The checks and balances are always there. The legitimate interests 
of member states in maintaining a strict control over anything the Commission 
does has a negative side-effect of adding layer after layer of procedures, and the 
amalgamation of different administrative and legal cultures into a common 
system adds to this complexity. Administrative reform and an ongoing effort to 
modernize and streamline must be part of the culture in order to avoid 
petrifaction. The lack of acceptance of adequate levels of staffing – 
quantitatively and qualitatively – is the Achilles heel of most regional 
integration processes. 
 
 
Democracy and Integration 
What is the relationship between democracy and integration? Obviously, history 
tells us about many great empires that, in terms of stability and longevity, 
demonstrate that integration does not necessarily presuppose democracy. 
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Conversely, it is also true that democracy does not in itself lead to regional 
integration. Nonetheless, the regional and global challenges that confront 
today’s world suggest that democratically negotiated solutions in 
institutionalized frameworks based on a functional approach are the way 
forward. There seems to be a kind of a symbiosis between democratic principles 
guiding states in their interactions, and integration as a main tool in designing, 
deciding and implementing solutions. Globally, problems such as climate 
change and trade negotiations illustrate this point. Regionally, looking, for 
instance, at the complexity of the vital issue of integrated water resource 
management in transboundary river basins is enough to make us understand the 
rationality and attractiveness of collective, democratically negotiated solutions 
that have the added quality of being monitored and enforced by a credible and 
neutral authority.  
 
The successive rounds of enlargement of the EU provide the strongest 
possible evidence of the attractiveness of the basic principles behind 
European integration as well as their practical application.  
 
The successive rounds of enlargement of the EU provide the strongest possible 
evidence of the attractiveness of the basic principles behind European 
integration as well as their practical application. It should also be noted that for 
countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal – not to mention the whole wave 
of Central and East European states and the Balkan countries – it was not only 
economic reasons that made the EU attractive. Membership of the EU made 
newly achieved democratization irreversible. More than the technicalities of 
their compliance with the legislative acquis of the EU, their compliance with the 
1993 Copenhagen Criteria on democracy and human rights was the needle’s eye 
for the former communist countries and dictatorships in the process leading to 
membership. This is also the case for the remaining candidate countries in the 
Balkan region as well as the protracted accession negotiations for Turkey. 
 
From the outside, the enlargement process has undoubtedly been perceived as 
proof of the democratic value and attractiveness of the European model. The list 
of countries on the periphery of Europe that wish to become members, including 
Ukraine and Morocco, illustrates this. Of course the EU cannot perform as the 
guarantor of democracy in the world simply by continuing a process of 
enlargement. Indeed, it is difficult to see much more happening than that which 
is already in the pipeline. The point has been made so effectively, however, that 
it has become an important element in the global branding and perception of the 
EU. 
 
 
5. Promoting Democracy: Tactics and Methods 
The first question to address is why we do it. There are several dimensions to the 
answer. Promoting the spread and the rooting of democratic ideals and practices 
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globally is simply a projection of Europe’s own ideology and experience. These 
are simply values that we believe in. The basic elements of the United Nations 
declarations on human rights and democracy to a large extent reflect Europe’s 
own development and history. Engaging actively in strengthening 
democratization underscores how we want to be perceived by the rest of the 
world. 
 
Promoting the spread and the rooting of democratic ideals and practices 
globally is simply a projection of Europe’s own ideology and experience. 
These are simply values that we believe in. The basic elements in the United 
Nations declarations on human rights and democracy to a large extent reflect 
Europe’s own development and history.  
 
But there is more to it. The endeavour to strengthen democracy in the world 
globally, regionally and at the individual country level also reflects the kind of a 
political world order that Europeans would like to promote, and this again can 
be seen as having two dimensions. First, there is a general belief in 
multilateralism and in the possibility of peacefully negotiated solutions to the 
problems and conflicts confronting mankind. Second, there is a recognition of 
the fact that defending and managing Europe’s global interests is better done in 
a political climate where ‘soft power’ is an option, which means that promoting 
multilateralism and international governance is also in Europe’s self-interest. 
 
The next question is: how do we do it? The list of so-called instruments relevant 
to this endeavour is so long that it almost brings to mind a symphony orchestra. 
This melodious picture, however, is not quite what most people have in mind 
when discussing the myriad rules and procedures linked to the different ways in 
which the EU carries out its activities in support, more or less directly, of 
democratization processes in different parts of the world. Democratization, 
election support, human rights promotion, administrative capacity building, 
judicial reform, support to independent media organizations, fighting corruption, 
civil society support – the list of activities directly related to the broad goal of 
supporting democratization is long. The initiative to reduce the enormous 
financial problems of the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) was also a 
crucial factor in securing political stability and preventing many poor countries 
from sinking into the misery of failed states – or even into conflict. 
Improvements in social services such as health and education as well as to 
infrastructure such as roads, and water and electricity supply are also related to 
the prospects for democracy. Reducing poverty enhances the prospect for 
democracy. 
 
The themes listed above for promoting democracy more directly are meaningful 
and important development goals in their own right, but they also reflect the fact 
that citizens, and thus voters, in the EU member states want these elements to be 
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present in any of the EU’s development cooperation strategies as well as in 
cases where the EU engages in security and stabilization efforts, such as in the 
Balkans. 
 
Conditionality and the Integrity of Development Cooperation Partnerships 
The phenomenon of conditionality is much discussed for many reasons. It can 
be seen as an intrusive misuse of the donor’s position of strength in the dialogue 
with a partner country, as an unavoidable political cost in the struggle to 
maintain public support in a donor country for continued or even increased 
assistance, or as an essential element, technically as well as politically, in 
safeguarding the efficiency and even meaning of a strategy for supporting a 
partner country. In recent years this discussion has received renewed attention in 
the light of the increased presence and activity of China – especially in Africa. 
The differences in the approach and partnership philosophy of China and the EU 
have been clearly exposed. For this reason, further remarks about conditionality 
and the EU’s democratization effort are called for. 
 
In principle member states are bound by the policies they have collectively 
agreed at the EU level, meaning that when they agree a development policy for 
the EU this policy applies not only to the actions of the Commission, but also to 
those of the member states. This is an often neglected aspect of the relationship 
between the Commission and the member states, and one of the reasons why the 
handling of relationships between the EU and partner countries globally is an 
ongoing and often delicate political calibration exercise. Adding the European 
Parliament to this situation as an active player does not simplify the picture. 
 
The differences between the profiles of individual member states in this respect 
as well as the spread of views in the European Parliament reflect real political 
views and interests and are part of the continued input of demands about what 
the EU should accomplish and stand for. For the Commission, the challenge is 
to formulate policies that make sense and can be applied in practice in partner 
countries. Often, the challenge is about shielding this policy and its application 
in specific situations and cases where political demands back in Europe are 
about reacting strongly, here and now. From time to time is has been necessary 
to remind member states that the ‘C’ in CFSP stands for common, not 
convenient – and certainly not colonial. 
 
Often, the challenge is about shielding this policy and its application in 
specific situations and cases where political demands back in Europe are 
about reacting strongly, here and now. From time to time is has been 
necessary to remind member states that the ‘C’ in CFSP stands for common, 
not convenient – and certainly not colonial.  
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Striking a workable balance in all this is an important task for the Commission. 
One could say this structure places the Commission in the role of a kind of 
moderator, cushioning the relationship between the EU and partner countries 
from the risk of excessive reaction in case of problems, and excessive 
conditionalities when discussing strategies for cooperation. On the other hand, 
this also means that when the Commission acts in cases of problems and gives 
priority to certain democracy- and governance- related elements of the dialogue, 
it does so with the weight of speaking on behalf of the whole Community. 
The moderating character of the role of the Commission is in practice further 
underscored by the difference in respect of the presence and permanence of the 
Commission compared to individual EU member states. Even the largest 
member states are not present on the ground in all developing countries, and the 
Commission does not have – and does not want – the option of terminating 
cooperation in a country or picking and choosing where to engage bilaterally. 
This gives the EU, acting collectively through the Commission, credibility as a 
long-term partner, which again puts a limit, or has a moderating effect, on the 
extent and character of political conditionalities.  
 
A look at the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the ongoing 
negotiations about Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU 
and the different regions of the ACP countries demonstrates the differences in 
thinking between the USA and the EU. The AGOA is more or less a catalogue 
of specific conditions that an African country must agree to in order to be 
accepted as a participant in the programme. The EPAs were thoroughly 
negotiated as part of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement and are now in the process of 
being finalized in negotiations with the different regions. 
 
In sum, the important questions to ask about conditionalities are: Do they make 
sense? Are they decent? Are they a result of real negotiations between the two 
sides of the partnership? Are they unilaterally imposed by the donor? Is there 
ownership and a real role for the partner country in the implementation of the 
measures contained in the conditionalities? If there are, they are legitimate 
elements in the partnership. If not, conditionalities represent a problematic and 
old fashioned colonial type of power projection that will poison the relationship. 
 
 
The Instruments 
In broad terms, four main instruments are prominent in EU efforts to promote 
democracy. First, there is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), which has annual average funding of EUR 160 million and a 
budget of EUR 1.1 billion for the years 2007–2013. This is the most explicit and 
direct instrument, but not necessarily the one with the biggest impact over the 
longer term. The amount is not big seen against the background of the number 
of years and the global scope of its coverage. Rather than being integrated into 
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the long-term strategies of the partner countries, and thus agreed by them, the 
activities supported are typically smaller projects that reflect the priorities set by 
the EU in support of democracy and human rights. The value of this initiative is 
to a large extent its flexibility and the relative speed of decision making as well 
as the high visibility of the EU effort – both at home and abroad.  
 
The second instrument is the development cooperation with 47 countries in 
Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf Region and Southern Africa 
based on country strategy papers with a five-year perspective. As a result of the 
reforms of the Commission’s handling of development cooperation carried out 
in 1999–2004, these country strategies must be in line with the overall 
development policy of the EU and must be negotiated in an inclusive manner 
with each partner country. Democratization and human rights are essential 
elements in these strategies, which indicates that these issues form part of the 
ongoing dialogue between the partners, unlike the projects carried out under the 
EIDHR. Average annual funding is EUR 1.4 billion and the budget for 2007–
2013 is EUR 10,057 billion. 
 
The share of the total allocation for each country related to democratization and 
human rights in a broad sense will vary quite a lot, based on the specific 
situation in each country. The broad range of countries, which includes middle 
income countries, leads to very different profiles in the country programmes. 
Political conditions also vary a lot in regard to the acceptability of, and the space 
given by the partner country to, larger or more direct interventions aimed at 
democratization and human rights protection. 
 
The third programme is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument, which covers 17 countries in the Middle East and the ring of 
countries surrounding the EU. Its average level of annual funding is EUR 1.6 
billion and EUR 11,181 billion was available for 2007–2013. 
 
The funding for these three instruments comes from the regular budget of the 
EU. This gives the European Parliament more direct influence than it has over 
the European Development Fund for the ACP countries, which is covered by the 
Cotonou Agreement. The EDF is negotiated separately from the EU budget and 
is also the result of negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries. It is 
also worth noting that the Development Committee of the European Parliament 
deals almost exclusively with the 79 ACP countries as well as the more general 
cross-cutting issues of development policy and humanitarian aid, whereas the 
External Relations Committee deals with the rest of the world, and with the 
External Relations Commissioner rather than the Commissioner for 
Development. In the Commission, the fact that implementation over all 
geographic areas and of all the different instruments is carried out by the 
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EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) helps to create some level of 
consistency and efficiency.  
 
The fourth instrument is the cooperation with 79 countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific under the Cotonou Agreement. Average annual 
funding is EUR 3.7 billion and EUR 22.7 billion has been made available for 
2007–2013. The EU-ACP partnership is unique in its scope. It comprises a 
structured political dialogue at the ministerial level between the two sides and in 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, massive development cooperation, and 
special trade relations and agreements and it has a time horizon of 20 years. It is 
also unique in the sense that it was thoroughly negotiated by the two sides in a 
long process before the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in the spring of 
2000 and again when updated in 2005. There was discussion about whether to 
write the principles of democracy, human rights, and so on, directly into the 
agreement or to express support for existing United Nations declarations. The 
decision was to do both, reflecting the political reality that the vast majority of 
the ACP countries wanted to use this agreement with the EU as a way of 
strengthening the democratization and human rights agenda in practice. 
 
There was even more discussion about opening direct support from the EU 
Commission to civil society organizations in the ACP countries. This was to be 
managed by the EU Delegations at country level and, although the government 
was naturally to be kept fully informed about the projects and beneficiaries, 
some of the less democratically advanced ACP countries saw this as an 
infringement of their national sovereignty. In the end, however, they all accepted 
it, and in just four years between five and ten per cent of the country envelopes 
was being devoted to civil society support. This has stimulated women’s 
organizations and trade unions as well as a wide range of human rights, social 
and environmental NGOs in these countries, had a directly or indirectly positive 
effect on the process of democratization and helped to legitimize pluralism in 
these societies. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement is also unique because it has instituted political 
dialogue as an element of the normal, ongoing functioning of the partnership 
and has a mechanism (article 96) to deal with the problems that arise when 
essential elements of the agreement concerning democratic principles, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights are violated, or in cases of serious 
corruption. Procedures for consultations involving the ACP side with 
representatives of countries in the region are set out to facilitate mediation 
efforts, and for drawing up a road map that might bring the country in question 
back on track. Applying sanctions such as reducing the level of cooperation or 
ultimately ceasing it for a period of time are measures of last resort in this 
process. These cases are always difficult, but the basic permanence of the 
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partnerships is never questioned, and in most cases it has been possible to 
enhance countries’ efforts to restore democracy after conflict, coup d’etats, 
rigged elections or corruption scandals. Rather than being a punitive instrument, 
article 96, and its practical application, has in fact been a successful tool in the 
protection and promotion of democracy, governance and human rights. 
Returning to the discussion above about conditionality, the Cotonou Agreement 
demonstrates the value of basing cooperation on a partnership that allows for 
real ownership and real negotiations on guiding principles. 
 
This spirit of partnership is also the reason why the working relationship 
between the EU Commission and the AU Commission has been given such high 
priority, which is perhaps most notable in the creation of the African Peace 
Facility in 2004 which has enabled the AU to play a crucial role in peacekeeping 
in Africa. 
 
These four instruments do not make up the totality of EU external aid, and for 
the purpose of presenting instruments with a direct relevance to the 
democratization effort the funding of non-state development actors and local 
authorities should be included. The average annual funding is EUR 230 million 
and the available funding for 2007–2013 is EUR 1.6 billion. Administratively, 
this instrument – often referred to as the NGO envelope – looks much like the 
EIDHR, but in substance it is more development-oriented. A lot of the activity 
supported through NGOs and local authorities overlaps with what the other 
instruments are trying to achieve. The qualitative aspect of involving NGOs is 
typically seen as the mobilization of civil society and the enhancement of 
independent voices in the public discourse. In addition, the task of countering 
corruption by acting as a watchdog has been mentioned by NGOs as one of their 
important functions. All this is true, but one has to be careful not to be tempted 
to do what is easiest rather than what is the most important. It is easy to fund 
NGOs but difficult to support and sustain a pluralist political system with a 
parliament in which the opposition and the backbenchers of the governing party 
also play meaningful roles, or to reform the judiciary in a country trying to turn 
its back on a past dominated by human rights violations or widespread 
corruption.  
 
The conclusion of these observations is that it probably makes good sense to 
have this many different instruments. They complement each other and offer a 
variety of options – for both the EU and the partner countries – and facilitate 
adaptation to the specific situation at hand, ranging from a standalone pinpointed 
action implemented by the Commission in a failed state or in a post-conflict 
situation to a structured long term programme for judicial reform carried out in 
close collaboration with the partner country’s government being in the driver’s 
seat. 
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It probably makes good sense to have this many different instruments. They 
complement each other and offer a variety of options – for both the EU and 
the partner countries – and facilitate adaptation to the specific situation at 
hand. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
When examining the conditions for ambitious integration schemes around the 
world and comparing them with the European experience, the most striking 
difference is that European integration started against the background of a 
clearly perceived need to do something about the structural problems of coal and 
steel, and as a condition set by a donor – the US Marshall Plan. In ASEAN, 
Mercosur and the African Union – and in most other more or less prominent 
cases – these elements and strong incentives are missing. It is more the other 
way round – that engaging in an integration project holds some promise and, 
from most analytical observations, represents the best strategy for securing 
prosperity and political stability in the region. This, however, is not the same as 
addressing a recognized problem that cannot be resolved unless it is resolved 
collectively. The long political overtures that accompany such regional efforts 
testify that integration is a wish more than a compelling necessity. As is noted 
above, however, more and more problems are emerging and being understood as 
problems that require an integrated and authoritative approach. Furthermore, the 
economic case for the need for Economic Partnership Agreements, with their 
strong dimension of regional liberalization and integration, to be finalized 
between the EU and the ACP regions, is increasingly perceived as the only 
realistic way to secure the smooth integration of the ACP countries and region 
into the global economy. 
 
The link between the accumulated experience of integration processes as a way 
of resolving problems and enhancing regional cooperation and political stability, 
on the one hand, and the endeavour of strengthening democracy, on the other, is 
undoubtedly a positive one. The achievements of the African Union in recent 
years testify to this fact. For the EU, continuing its support for democratization 
through all its instruments is both meaningful and important, but the decisive 
contribution will come from the EU’s own behaviour globally. That is what 
determines the credibility of the actions undertaken under the banner of 
promoting democracy. 
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